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ABSTRACT 
The aviation and space domains have safety 
guidelines and recommended practices for Design 
Organisations (DOs) and Operators alike. In terms 
of Aerospace DOs there are certification criteria to 
meet and to demonstrate compliance there are 
Advisory Circulars or Acceptable Means of 
Compliance to follow. Additionally there are 
guidelines such as Aerospace Recommended 
Practices (ARP), Military Standards (MIL-STD 
882 series) and System Safety Handbooks to follow 
in order to identify and manage failure conditions. 
In terms of Operators there are FAA guidelines and 
a useful ARP that details many tools and 
techniques in understanding Operator Safety Risks. 
However there is currently no methodology for 
linking the DO and Operator safety efforts. In the 
space domain NASA have provided safety 
standards and guidelines to follow and also within 
Europe there are European Co-operation of Space 
Standardization (ECSS) to follow. Within the 
emerging Commercial Human Spaceflight 
Industry, the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space 
Transportation has provided hazard analysis 
guidelines. However all of these space domain 
safety documents are based on the existing 
aerospace methodology and once again, there is no 
link between the DO and Operator’s safety effort.    
 
This paper addresses the problematic issue and 
presents a coherent methodology of joining up the 
System Safety effort of the DOs to the Operator 
Safety Risk Management such that a ‘Total 
System’ approach is adopted. Part of the rationale 
is that the correct mitigation (control) can be 
applied within the correct place in the accident 
sequence. Also this contiguous approach ensures 
that the Operator is fully aware of the safety risks 
(at the accident level) and therefore has an 
appreciation of the Total System Risk.  
 
The authors of this paper contend that it is better 
practice to have a fully integrated safety model as 
opposed to disparate requirements or guidelines. 
Our methodology is firstly to review ‘best practice’ 
approaches from the aviation and space industries, 
and then to integrate these approaches into a 
contiguous safety model for the commercial human 
spaceflight industry. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Within the aerospace and space sectors there are 
regulations, standards and guidance material to 
govern the activities and to assist the designers and 
operators in attaining the required level of safety. 
In the first instance, aircraft designers build aircraft 
such that they can sell their certified product to 
many operators; thus when they deliver the aircraft 
their main part of the job is done and they then 
provide additional information such as Service 
Bulletins (in the event of serious issues) and so on. 
The operator then begins their involvement in the 
safety effort by identifying operator risks and then 
managing Air Safety Reports (ASRs) when 
incidents occur. However the operator analysis may 
be qualitative or based on different metrics than the 
designer analysis i.e. it is focused only on the 
operations. As this has been the case for many 
years some may ask why this approach should be 
questioned. Others may state that one cannot merge 
the designer and operator analysis. This paper 
attempts to address this problematic issue because 
of the perceived nature (role) of the emerging 
suborbital players; meaning that suborbital 
designers such as XCOR1, EADS (Astrium)2 and 
Rocketplane3 will not only design the vehicles 
(only a handful of vehicles initially) but will also 
operate them. Herein lays the issue whereby civil 
aerospace aircraft designers do not operate vehicles 
and so there is no guidance to achieve this. 
 
2. CURRENT DISPARATE SAFETY 
ANALYSIS APPROACH  
The current approach towards safety is to undertake 
analysis to meet requirements and targets 
(objectives) as applicable to the boundaries of said 
requirements. The metrics involved are different 
for designers and operators and therefore a 
contiguous approach is not employed. The 
disparate approach is illustrated in Figure 1 below: 
 
 
                                                 
1 http://www.xcor.com/ 
2 ttp://www.astrium.eads.net/en/programme/space-
plane.html 
3 http://www.rocketplane.com/ 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Disparate Relationship between Design 
Analysis and Operator-based Analysis 
In particular there are different probability 
classifications between DO and operator in that the 
DO is analysing failure conditions and operators 
are analysing safety risk through flight data 
monitoring. There may be similar severity 
classifications although catastrophic is seen by 
some as a single death whereas its severity relates 
to multiple deaths in other classifications. The 
operator thinks in terms of specific accident or 
Safety Significant Event (SSE) i.e. a near mid-air 
collision (MAC), whereas the DO works to failure 
conditions with associated severity i.e. no specific 
accident detailed rather it is implicit. 
 
2.1. Design Organisation Analysis 
In the Civil Aviation industry the designers must 
meet certification baseline requirements and in 
terms of safety this includes meeting specified 
safety objectives for failure conditions i.e. for a 
catastrophic failure condition the designer must 
meet 1E-9 per flying hour. The Aircraft Loss target 
stated in Federal Aviation Regulations 
(FAR)/Certification Specification (CS) 25.1309[3] 
is based on the world-wide accident rate which is 
about one per million flight hours, i.e. a probability 
of 1E-6 per hour of flight. The accident rate was 
first analysed in the UK for the British Civil 
Aviation Requirements (BCAR). It was deduced 
that 10% of accidents were attributed to failure 
conditions involving critical aircraft systems, i.e. 
1E-1 therefore the overall target is 1E-7. Arbitrarily 
it was deduced that there were approximately 100 
system catastrophic failure conditions assumed to 
exist on civil aircraft, i.e. 1E+2. Therefore to 
prevent a deterioration of the current fatal accident 
rate, DOs must show that the probability of 
occurrence of each catastrophic failure condition 
was at least 1E-6 x1E-1/1E+2 = 1E-9 per flying hour. 
 
This criteria and logic follows to ‘hazardous’, 
major and minor failure conditions and these have 
apportioned safety objectives per §25.1309[3]. 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between probability 
of a failure condition and its associated severity 
classification.   
 
Figure 2: Relationship between Probability and Severity 
of Failure Condition Effects – from CS-25 
 
Failure Conditions are recognised events from 
standard Functional Hazard Analysis (FHA) such 
that DOs must meet the associated safety objective. 
The following examples are from §23.1309 [4]: 
• Catastrophic Failure Condition; 
o  Misleading attitude information 
to control roll and pitch  
• Hazardous Failure Condition: 
o Total Loss of altitude information 
 
The above failure condition within the DO analysis 
(such as using Fault Tree Analysis) consists of 
lower-level system hazards and these in turn have 
contributory events (causes or base events). This 
explicit relationship is shown in Figure 3: 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Design level sequence to Failure Condition 
The DO’s Risk Reduction methodology is based on 
the ‘fail-safe’ design concept, which considers the 
effects of failures and combinations of failures in 
defining a safe design.  This paper recognises this 
and assumes that DOs implement the fail-safe 
design concept in order to achieve the desired 
safety objectives and therefore provide an 
airworthy aircraft that meets its certification 
requirements. 
 
Guidelines for designers are comprehensive in the 
aircraft domain such as ARP 4754 [5] and ARP 
4761 [6] for system safety analysis and also MIL-
STD 882-D [7].  
 
2.2. Operator Safety Analysis 
In terms of operator analysis there are various 
guidelines on implementing a Safety Management 
 
 
System (SMS) and employing a Flight Operations 
Quality Assurance (FOQA) process. However 
unlike their designer counterpart there are no 
specific safety targets or safety objectives to meet 
from a regulatory standpoint. 
 
The FOQA process gathers data from a Quick 
Access Recorder (QAR) and identifies flight 
activities that are problematic in an operational 
sense because they are unsafe, inefficient or 
inconsistent with standard operating procedures. 
Operators then use the data in different ways and 
typically present these in ‘Risk Profiles’ to show 
the most frequent (and severe) events. Operator’s 
safety department may also employ a hazard log 
and identify operator hazards; these will tend to be 
qualitative based. Guidelines to assist operators in 
undertaking safety analysis is contained in ARP 
5150 [8], FAA AC 120-92 [9] and also AC150-
5200 [10]. Figure 4 below details a suggested Risk 
Matrix for operators: 
 
Figure 4: AC150-5200 SMS for Air Operators 
In terms of understanding accident sequences other 
guidance material is available for operators such as 
the Global Aviation Information Network (GAIN) 
[11] whereby they indicate an operator based 
sequence leading to a primary hazard as depicted in 
Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: GAIN’s operator accident sequence 
The Aviation Risk Management Solution 
(ARMS) methodology [11]: Global 
Aviation Information Network, 
Operator’s Flight Safety 
Handbook, Issue 2, December 
2001 
[12] is a reasonable attempt at providing a system 
for operators to assess their risks by introducing an 
Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) process. The 
ARMS methodology and Excel spread-sheet (tool) 
is aimed at airlines and other air operators and is 
based on a two-tiered approach including a 
preliminary Event Risk Classification scheme 
followed by a more specific Safety Issues Risks 
Assessment (SIRA). The rationale stated in the 
methodology is that ‘pre-ARMS’ standard 
methodology is not anchored to any recognised 
industry reference’ (in terms of Operator Risk 
Management Matrices with severity and 
probability); this is correct and hence this paper has 
also recognised this but has focused on a new 
safety model that provides a contiguous safety 
approach i.e. the operator analysis is anchored to 
the design analysis and the metrics (per flying 
hour) are constant.  
 
 
Figure 6: ARMS model 
3. CONTIGUOUS SAFETY MODEL 
 
Having identified that a gap exists between DO 
analysis and operator analysis the way forward 
would point to a function that could link to two 
disparate methods. As can be seen in Figure 7 
below there are clear boundaries between systems, 
failure conditions and the aircraft. 
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Figure 7: Boundaries between Systems and the Aircraft 
 
Figure 8 below introduces a platform level hazard 
(the Key Hazard) that provides this function of 
linking the failure condition to an explicit accident. 
This is required such that the operator 
acknowledges their role in the accident sequence so 
that they can implement the operator controls and 
limitations more effectively. They will then 
explicitly know their accident risks and arguably if 
these were summed and shown to be independent 
accidents then the Total Risk for the aircraft and its 
personnel would be known. 
 
 
Figure 8: Extended sequence to the accident via a 
platform level ‘Key Hazard’ 
3.1. Aircraft Level Hazards 
The DO analyses scope is up to the failure 
condition level in order to demonstrate that they 
have met the safety objectives. So it is here where 
we must start to continue the accident sequence and 
the obvious place to look is within the existing 
guidelines. ARP4754 [5] for example shows that 
there are indeed higher-level ‘aircraft hazards’ and 
these would equate to the ‘key hazards’ in the 
contiguous safety model.  
So these higher-level aircraft hazards are key in 
that they are a not a function but a state of the 
aircraft and in particular within the accident 
sequence is when a ‘hazardous state’ occurs. For 
example misleading airspeed is a known failure 
condition but in itself does not directly lead to an 
accident and requires other events to occur. These 
other events such as change of flight parameter 
(height, angle of attack etc.) are then controlled by 
the pilot procedures and training; which is in the 
remit of the operator analysis.  
 
As an example let us call this hazardous state a key 
hazard (at the aircraft level); for instance 
undetected (by pilot) vertical position error. Here 
we have a hazardous state whereby the failure 
condition has occurred AND the aircraft is not on 
its intended vertical level AND the pilot has not 
noticed or corrected (controlled) sufficiently.  
 
The contiguous model is depicted in Figure 9 
whereby the DO analysis (using Fault Tree 
Analysis for instance) demonstrates the vehicle 
meets the failure condition. The operator analysis 
would then use the failure condition as the starting 
point (either within a FTA or Event Tree Analysis) 
 
Figure 9: Contiguous Safety Model depicting Designer Fault Trees and Operator analysis through the Key 
Hazard (aircraft level) to the Accident 
 
 
to continue the sequence by linking the failure 
condition via the key Hazard to the explicit 
Accident (or SSE). The operator is then well placed 
to link the relevant pilot procedural/training 
controls or Limitations within the sequence. This 
will then enable the operator to determine an 
Accident Risk (based on probability and severity). 
 
 
 
3.2. Specific Accidents 
There are specific recognised International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO) Accidents such as 
‘Mid-Air Collision (MAC) and Controlled Flight 
into Terrain (CFIT). These can be explicitly linked 
via the aircraft level hazardous state (the key 
hazard) and also the post-accident controls can be 
detailed more effectively (both designer-based and 
operator-based). The explicit accidents from ICAO 
[13] are: 
 
1. Loss of Control – In flight (LOC-I) 
2. Loss of Control – Ground (LOC-G) 
3. Controlled Flight into Terrain (CFIT) 
4. Mid Air Collision (MAC) 
5. Explosion (Fuel Related) 
6. Fire/Smoke (Non-Impact) 
7. Fire/Smoke (post impact) 
8. Loss of Thrust (system/component failure 
or malfunction – power-plant)  
9. Structural Failure  
10. System/Component failure or malfunction 
– non-power-plant 
 
Additionally there are specific recognised ICAO 
Safety Significant Events (SSE). These are the non-
catastrophic events that occur occasionally and are 
reported via the ASRs. Once again these can be 
explicitly linked via key hazards to SSEs and the 
controls can then be examined more closely as to 
their effectiveness. The ICAO list is as follows: 
 
1. CFIT only marginally avoided 
2. Near Mid Air Collisions  
3. Events requiring the emergency use of 
oxygen by the flight crew 
4. Aircraft structural failure/engine 
disintegrations not classified as an 
accident 
5. Crew Incapacitation 
6. Emergency Oxygen Use 
7. Near Structural Failure 
8. Fuel Emergency 
9. Near LOC-I (performance) 
10. Near LOC-I (Ops) 
 
3.3. Specific Mitigation 
3.3.1. Design Controls 
The design mitigation is well documented and 
structured in the system safety analysis and this 
follows the best practice ‘safety precedence 
sequence’: 
• Eliminate the hazard 
• Reduce the likelihood 
• Reduce the severity 
• Implement safety features 
• Implement Warning Devices 
• Provide procedures 
• Provide Training 
 
3.3.2. Operator Controls 
In terms of operator mitigation this takes the form 
of operator procedures, training and limitations. 
The reason for detailing and linking specific 
controls within the accident sequence is to be able 
to manage the controls more effectively. When a 
significant incident occurs (SSE) such as ‘CFIT 
only marginally avoided’ then the ‘failed’ controls 
can be scrutinised and improved (or new controls 
added).  
 
Figure 10 below depicts a contiguous accident 
sequence with controls (green). From the sequence 
we can see that in order for an accident to occur 
would require the prime equipment (system) to fail, 
failure of the operating procedures (to use the 
design [redundancy] control) which then leads to 
the key hazard (hazardous state) and finally failure 
of any emergency procedures, lack of training 
and/or breach of any limitations. 
 
It is important for both designer and operator to 
understand whether they are dealing with a 
‘barrier’ control or ‘recovery’ control and that they 
form influencing factors within an accident 
sequence. Without the operator understanding the 
explicit sequence and how much ‘credit’ is taken 
for the operator controls then catastrophic accidents 
and hazardous events will continue (when in actual 
fact they could be prevented – this is proactive and 
cohesive safety management). 
 
Figure 10:  Explicit controls shown in the accident sequence 
 
 
 
3.4. Case Study – Air France AF447 
This section provides an example of the operator 
not fully understanding the explicit accident 
sequence and the importance of the ‘credit’ taken 
for operator controls (or lack of). This case study 
builds on the current facts that are known from the 
Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA) Interim 
Reports No.2 [14] and No.3 [15]. The case study of 
the AF447 disaster is representative of the 
disconnect that exists between Design 
Organisations and Airline Operators. The authors 
acknowledge that they do communicate, 
particularly in the form of Service Bulletins (SB) 
when a Safety Significant Event (Serious Incident) 
requires changes to design or procedural/ 
maintenance inspection strategies (as per the TWA 
flight 800 that resulted in Special Federal Aviation 
Regulation 88 requirements and subsequent SBs). 
The case study shows that previous Serious 
Incidents (from the Automatic Communication 
Addressing and Reporting System [ACARS]) 
resulted in SBs concerning a new design for the 
pitot-tubes yet Air France were still flying aircraft 
with the standard pitot-tubes 
 
By using the SATURN SAFETY MODEL we can 
examine the sequential components and determine 
those that failed. In Figure 11 below we can see 
that the following controls failed: 
• Redundant sensors – the 3 pitot tubes were the 
same and therefore were subject to common 
mode failures 
• Key hazard procedural control failure – 
operating procedure to control the aircraft (at 5 
degrees nose up and 85 per cent power  is the 
standard procedure) 
• Emergency recovery procedures (and training) 
– once passed the hazardous state of 
undetected speed error the pilot should have 
recovered the aircraft before the onset of stall 
i.e. the warnings of stall normally include 
‘stick-shakers’ and warning horns 
• No Limitations in place either to; 
o Avoid the altitude that the pitot-tubes 
could be subject to super-cooled water 
droplets and icing i.e. fly below Flight 
Level 310 (this would require more fuel to 
be carried to cross the Atlantic) 
o Avoid Flight in Icing conditions and flight 
in or near thunderstorms i.e. fly around 
(divert off track) any Cumulonimbus 
clouds (this would require more fuel to be 
carried if the forecast indicated clouds)  
 
In this instance any of these design or operator 
controls could have broken the accident chain. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Case Study of Flight Air France AF447 to demonstrate contiguous Safety Model – details failed or missing controls 
 
 
 
A Waterfall diagram can be useful to show the 
existing level of Risk followed by the Risk as a 
result of a serious event. Then the proposed Risk 
reduction is detailed over an appropriate timescale. 
Figure 12 shows a tolerable level of risk (say for an 
individual accident of Loss of Control) and a new 
risk being identified i.e. a pitot-tube issue. A design 
organisation would initiate a Service Bulletin due 
to the fault but where does that leave the operator 
(instantaneously) in terms of risk? The designer 
normally gives a time period for implementing the 
SB but in the case of Air France AF447 they were 
still flying ten days after the issue of the SB (to 
change the pitot-tubes). The operator could have 
reviewed the previous occurrences in a ‘Hazard 
Review Board’ with the safety manager, chief pilot 
and design representative as a minimum. Then they 
could have identified the following control failures: 
• Design Control failures: 
o Redundant system failures – design 
organisation issued pitot-tubes 
• Operator Control failures: 
o Amend or re-brief normal procedures (this 
has now been done by Air France) 
o Amend the specific training or ensure 
pilots are trained more often (this has now 
been done by Air France) 
o Amend or re-brief emergency procedures 
(this has now been done by Air France) 
o Amend the emergency training or ensure 
pilots are trained more often (this has now 
been done by Air France) 
o Add a Limitation – this was not done and 
is not required now because the design 
control has effectively reduced the risk 
 
These could be plotted on the Waterfall diagram to 
show proactive safety management in dealing with 
the risk whilst awaiting the design to be fully 
implemented (across the fleet).  
 
4. RELEVANCE TO COMMERCIAL 
SPACEFLIGHT  
The previous sections highlighted a gap between 
the design safety analysis and operator safety 
analysis within the commercial aviation domain. A 
‘Key Hazard’ was identified at the platform level 
that could bridge the gap and therefore result in a 
contiguous safety approach. Is this approach 
applicable for the commercial spaceflight domain? 
In the commercial spaceflight domain the designer 
and operator are arguably have a much closer 
relationship than their aviation counterparts and in 
a lot of cases may be the same organisation i.e. in 
the suborbital domain XCOR will design and 
operate their ‘Lynx’ vehicle and for orbital flights 
‘Space X’ will design and operate their Falcon 
spacecraft. 
 
 
Figure 12: Waterfall diagram depicting the change in Risk due to a Safety Significant Event and subsequent mitigation strategies to reduce 
the Risk 
 
 
4.1. Aid to Certification/Launch License 
Approval 
This close relationship can only assist in gaining 
certification or gaining a launch license approval 
from the authorities. Not only will the company be 
able to demonstrate the design (system safety) 
analysis they will be able to explicitly detail the 
accident risks involved with the vehicle. They will 
be able to demonstrate the ‘barrier’ controls in the 
design analysis (such as in Fault Trees) and also 
demonstrate the operator controls within the 
contiguous accident sequence. 
 
4.1.1.  Safety Target 
This contiguous safety model approach is designed 
to assist in demonstrating that requirements and 
targets have been met.  
 
The NASA Commercial Crew Development 
Program is a chance to enforce proper design and 
safety requirements in a formal and recognised 
approach (as opposed to a disparate approach for 
Space Shuttle and the International Space Station). 
Here is a new development and the safety model 
can arguably be applied for the orbital domain. The 
‘System’ is a vertical reusable launch vehicle with 
expendable rocket boosters. Using the IAASS-
ISSB Space Safety Standards Manual [16] we have 
a catastrophic (loss) safety target of 1 x10-3 per 
mission. The next question to ask is can we use the 
same methodology per aviation to derive system 
level risk budgets? i.e. 10% of failures are due to 
critical systems therefore the catastrophic target is 
1 x10-4 per mission. Then in aviation there are 100 
arbitrary critical systems and therefore in this case 
the safety objectives for catastrophic failure 
conditions would be in the order of 1 x10-6 per 
mission. Is this practical? – some may say not when 
considering the Rocket Propulsion System (RPS) 
would be in the order of 1 x10-4 per mission 
(thereby using up the entire risk budget). 
 
But by using this safety target approach (with 
implicit safety objectives for lower level failure 
conditions) it drives the designer to build in 
redundancy; only then will the safety targets be 
close to being met from the design perspective. 
 
Then we use the safety model to continue the 
accident sequence to the Spacecraft level key 
hazards and up to the accident and then beyond the 
accident (fire/explosion) with abort system and 
survivability systems as mitigation; thereby 
reducing the risk of multiple deaths (1st party 
crewmembers) and/or deaths to the support 
personnel (2nd parties) or the public (3rd parties). 
 
The operator controls, training and limitations 
(flight profile, temperature limitations etc.) can be 
explicitly shown in the safety model and therefore 
the Accident Risks can be calculated. Also the 
abort systems and survivability systems can be 
shown ‘post’ the Accident in the sequence and 
appropriate credit taken within the analysis (further 
risk reduction). This is even more important to 
demonstrate this explicitly and in a contiguous 
manner should the safety target not be met i.e. the 
design fails to meet the safety target (but is within 
an order of magnitude for instance) and therefore 
the claims are on operator procedures, limitations 
and post-accident controls; this will therefore 
provide a more convincing argument to the 
authorities as to why the Spacecraft is ‘acceptably 
safe’.  
 
The same approach can also be used in the 
suborbital domain; even more so where some 
designs are aircraft-based and employ similar 
known sub-systems. Here a catastrophic (loss) 
safety target may be in the order of 1 x10-4 per 
mission (flight hour equals a mission in this case). 
This is also challenging in that the RPS will be the 
main contributor once more and the design analysis 
will have to include the exposure factor (circa 90 
seconds) which will assist in the calculations. Once 
again the safety model can explicitly detail the 
failure conditions and then accident risks via key 
hazards at the platform level; thus assisting with 
certification or launch license approval.  
 
4.2. Spaceflight Case Study 
To demonstrate the use of the contiguous safety 
model in the spaceflight domain we will use the 
Space Shuttle Challenger disaster as a case study. 
On 28 Jan 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger launched 
at 0500hrs (US time) after having been delayed 
from previous launches. Seconds after Launch 
Challenger’s Expendable Rocket Boosters 
exploded, destroying the Space Shuttle System; all 
on board were killed in the ‘mishap’. According to 
Diane Vaughan [17] the management played a 
large part in the Challenger disaster in that they 
authorised a Launch when the temperatures were 
extremely low and this was against the advice of 
the engineers who knew that the O-Ring seals had a 
history of blow-backs at low temperatures. 
 
Figure 13 below details the sequence using the 
safety model and the control failures can clearly be 
identified as: 
 
• Pressure sensors not providing sufficient data 
in time 
• Flight Termination System – not able to 
protect the astronauts in time 
• Crew Pod ejection – not able to protect the 
astronauts in time 
• Limitation ignored – the 53° F limitation for 
the O-Rings was ignored by the management 
against the engineer’s advice 
 
 
 
Arguably the first three controls above are design 
controls and it is the last control (the operator-
based limitation) that could have easily averted the 
accident. This clearly shows the importance of 
recognising the ‘soft’ operator-based controls in an 
explicit accident sequence. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has highlighted that a gap exists 
between design safety analysis and operator safety 
analysis. This lack of contiguous safety approach 
has meant that operators are not fully aware of the 
specific accident and near-accident risks and this 
has resulted in catastrophic losses in the space and 
aviation domains – losses that could have been 
avoided by effective, proactive and contiguous 
safety management. There are currently no 
guidelines on how to achieve a contiguous safety 
model but there are effective and separate 
guidelines for designers and operators. 
 
The model presented by this paper employs a ‘key 
hazard’ in joining the failure conditions (from 
designers) to the accidents and safety significant 
events that operators should be managing.  This 
‘key hazard’ represents a hazardous state at the 
aircraft level, whereas a failure condition is below 
this level (but above a system hazard level). This is 
important within a contiguous safety model 
because it is important to place the controls in the 
correct place so that they can be managed more 
effectively who are responsible for them i.e. that an 
operator manages the operating procedures, 
training and actively enforce limitations that are 
derived through design or from operations. 
 
The paper concludes that the contiguous safety 
model can be applied in the aviation domain but 
states that it is important that it is applied in the 
commercial spaceflight domain because the 
designer and operator will be the same organisation 
in most cases. This being the case will assist in the 
certification or approval of launch licenses where it 
is envisaged that a safety target approach will be 
required i.e. a catastrophic (loss) safety target of 1 
x10-3 per mission for orbital operations and 1 x10-4 
per mission for suborbital operations. Here the 
designer/operator will be able to demonstrate the 
achieved failure condition probabilities and then 
demonstrate the explicit contribution of operator 
controls (procedures, training and limitations) 
within the accident sequence. This may be an 
important factor because the Rocket Propulsion 
System will no doubt be the main contributor to the 
catastrophic loss case and the analyst will have to 
include exposure factors (along with safe design 
measures) to assist in achieving the required level 
of safety. 
 
The paper demonstrated the use of the contiguous 
safety model in aviation and space case studies and 
concludes that by employing such an approach that 
future disasters could be avoided. 
 
 
Figure 13 : Case Study of Space Shuttle Challenger to demonstrate contiguous Safety Model – details failed or missing controls 
 
 
ABBREVIATIONS & ACRONYMS 
 
AC Advisory Circular 
ACARS Automatic Communication Addressing and 
Reporting System 
ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable 
AMC Acceptable Means of Compliance 
ARAC Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee 
ARP Aerospace Recommended Practice 
AST Commercial Space Transportation  
BAE Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses 
CBA Cost Benefit Analysis 
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
CS Certification Specification 
CFIT Controlled Flight Into Terrain 
DO Design organisation 
EASA European Aviation Safety Agency 
ELOS  Equivalent Level of Safety 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FHA Functional Hazard Analysis 
FOQA Flight Operations Quality Assurance 
GAIN Global Aviation Information Network 
HRI Hazard Risk Index 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organisation 
LOC Loss of Control 
MAC Mid-Air Collision  
OHL Operator Hazard Level 
QAR Quick Access Recorder 
SoA Suborbital Aircraft 
SIRA Safety Issues Risks Assessment 
SS System Safety 
SMS Safety Management System 
SSE Significant Safety Event 
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